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NODIS
FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI

FOLLOWING REPEAT CAIRO 10380 SENT ACTION SECSTATE 21 JUN 77

QUOTE S E C R E T CAIRO 10380

NODIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, EG
SUBJECT: SADAT'S ACCOUNT OF FAHMY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW

REF: (A) CAIRO 9970, (B) CAIRO 10205, (C) CAIRO 10240

SUMMARY: SADAT PROVIDED DETAILED BRIEFING OF FAHMY'S
TALKS WITH GROMYKO AND BREZHNEV, USING MINUTES OF MEETINGS.
GROMYKO INSISTED NEW POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP IS PRECONDITION
TO ANY FURTHER SOVIET ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL HELP.
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REJECT FAHMY PROPOSAL FOR "DECLARATION" DEFINING
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, AND INSTEAD GROMYKO
HANDED OVER A TWELVE-POINT DRAFT "POLITICAL DOCUMENT"
FOR THIS PURPOSE. IN SADAT'S VIEW, DRAFT DOCUMENT GOES
BEYOND NOW TERMINATED 1971 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION AND WOULD GIVE SOVIETS RIGHT STOP ANY ASSISTANCE
IF THEY DISAPPROVE OF EGYPTIAN ACTIONS. ALTHOUGH SOVIETS
AGREED TO RETURN SEVENTY-TWO REPAIRED MIG ENGINES STILL
BEING HELD IN MOSCOW AND TO PROVIDE FIVE ADDITIONAL MI-8
HELICOPTERS, RESUMPTION OF SPARE PARTS DELIVERIES MADE CONDITIONAL
ON POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND SUBJECT TO HARD CURRENCY PAYMENT.
BREZHNEV ALSO EMPHASIZED NEED FOR CLEARLY DEFINED POLITICAL

DOCUMENT, SIGNED AND RATIFIED BY BOTH PARTIES, BEFORE OTHER AID COULD BE CONSIDERED. BREZHNEV TOOK EXCEPTION TO STATEMENTS USG HOLDS NINETY-NINE PERCENT OF THE CARDS AND WARNED THAT IMPERIALISTS', E.G., UNITED STATES', SOLE PURPOSE IS TO PROTECT ISRAEL AND THEIR INTERESTS IN THE AREA. ACCORDING SADAT, BREZHNEV MADE TWO "THREATS." FIRST WAS IN FORM OF STRONG STATEMENT THAT SOVIETS WILL NOT ALLOW GENEVA CONFERENCE BE USED TO DEVIATE FROM OBJECTIVE OF OBTAINING COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT ACCEPTABLE TO ARABS. SECOND, HE EMPHASIZED DETERMINATION SUPPORT ETHIOPIA AT ALL COSTS AND SOLIDIFY SOVIET POSITION IN AFRICA. BREZHNEV PROMISED SOVIETS WOULD SEE TO IT THAT ETHIOPIA TAKES NO HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST SUDAN, BUT ASKED THAT GOE USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH SUDAN TO MODERATE LATTER'S POSITION. SOVIETS, IN SADAT'S VIEW, AGAIN SEEKING "SQUEEZE" HIM, BUT HE WILL NOT SUCCUMB. NO REPLY YET SENT AND SADAT INTENDS TAKE HIS TIME BEFORE DOING SO. MEANWHILE, HE WOULD WELCOME PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEWS ON SOVIET TACTICS AND OBJECTIVES. FINALLY, SADAT RECONFIRMED WHAT HE AND PRESIDENT CARTER AGREED UPON IN PRIVATE MEETING. END SUMMARY

1. MET WITH SADAT FOR HOUR AND HALF, JUNE 20, IN ALEXANDRIA. AFTER APOLOGIZING FOR ASKING ME TO MAKE LONG TRIP TO ALEXANDRIA ON TWO
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CONSECUTIVE DAYS, HE SAID HE WAS ANXIOUS TO PROVIDE PRESIDENT CARTER WITH PROMISED REPORT ON FAHMY'S TALKS IN MOSCOW. HE HAD WITH HIM FAHMY'S REPORTS, INCLUDING MINUTES OF MEETINGS WITH GROMYKO AND GREZHNEV, AND HAD BEEN STUDYING THEM. HE WANTED PRESIDENT CARTER TO KNOW WHAT HAD TRANSPIRED AND WOULD WELCOME ANY VIEWS THE PRESIDENT MIGHT HAVE. HE THEN GAVE FOLLOWING ACCOUNT, OFTEN READING FROM THE FAHMY REPORT.

2. MEETING WITH GROMYKO: IN INITIAL MEETING WITH GROMYKO, THE LATTER HAD INSISTED THAT THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE HAD TO BE CHANGED BETWEEN EGYPT AND USSR BEFORE ANYTHING ELSE COULD BE DONE. THIS REQUIRED A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. IN RESPONSE TO FAHMY'S SUGGESTION THAT THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES MIGHT BE DEFINED IN A "DECLARATION," GROMYKO WAS NEGATIVE. HE INSISTED A "DECLARATION" NOT ADEQUATE. INSTEAD, A "POLITICAL DOCUMENT," DULY SIGNED AND RATIFIED BY BOTH PARTIES, WAS NECESSARY. HERE SADAT INTERJECTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE IN EFFECT DEMANDING A "TREATY" WITHOUT WHICH NO OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES COULD BE SOLVED.

3. GROMYKO INDICATED THAT SOVIETS HAD PREPARED A TWELVE ARTICLE DRAFT "POLITICAL DOCUMENT" AND PRESENTED IT TO FAHMY. THE DRAFT, AS SADAT SAW IT, IS MODELED CLOSELY ON THE ABROGATED 1971 EGYPTIAN/ SOVIET TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION, BUT GOES BEYOND THE EARLIER AGREEMENT. THE NEW DRAFT'S SPECIFIC ARTICLES, AS PROVIDED BY SADAT, ARE AS FOLLOWS:

ARTICLE I. BOTH SIDES PLEDGE TO RESPECT EACH OTHER'S SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, AND COMMIT THEMSELVES

NOT TO INTERFERE IN EACH OTHER'S AFFAIRS.

ARTICLE II. THE PARTIES PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO MUTUAL ASSISTANCE AND, WHAT SADAT CALLED, "MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS" AS SET FORTH ELSEWHERE IN THE DRAFT DOCUMENT.

ARTICLE III. SOVIETS ATTACH PRIME IMPORTANCE TO THE DEVELOPMENT
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OF A NEW RELATIONSHIP IN THE POLITICAL FIELD AS THE BASIS FOR ANY OTHER RELATIONS THAT MIGHT BE DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. (SADAT VIEWS THIS AS A VERY IMPORTANT DEMAND.)

ARTICLE IV. GENERAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES IN FIELDS OF ECONOMICS, INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE AND ENERGY.

ARTICLE V. THERE SHOULD BE COOPERATION IN COMMERCIAL AND MARITIME AND NAVAL ACTIVITIES. (SADAT VIEWS THIS AS A REQUEST TO BE ALLOWED RESUME USE OF ALEXANDRIA NAVAL FACILITIES, WHICH WERE TERMINAED BY GOE LAST YEAR.)

ARTICLE VI. THERE SHOULD BE RECIPROCAL COOPERATION IN TV, BROADCASTING, PRESS, CINEMA, TOURISM AND SPORTS.

ARTICLE VII. THERE SHOULD BE EXCHANGE OF VISITS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES AT ALL LEVELS. PARTICULAR REFERENCE WAS MADE TO SYNDICATES, TRADE UNION LEADERS, ETC.

ARTICLE VIII. BOTH PARTIES AGREE TO COOPERATE IN THE MILITARY FIELD ON THE BASIS OF SPECIFIC, NEW AGREEMENTS TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THEM. (SADAT OPINED THIS ARTICLE TAKEN FROM ARTICLE VIII OF OLD TREATY, BUT HAD BEEN MADE WEAKER.)

ARTICLE IX. BOTH PARTIES PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO WORK FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

ARTICLE X. GENERAL REFERENCE TO BOTH PARTIES COOPERATING TO EASE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

ARTICLE XI. BOTH PARTIES CONDEMN IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, RACISM, APARTHIED, ETC.

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ARTICLE XII. BOTH PARTIES PLEDGE THEMSELVES TO CONTINUE THEIR CONTACTS AND DISCUSSIONS IN ALL MATTERS CONCERNING WAR AND PEACE. (THIS, SADAT NOTED, IS STRONGER THAN THE PREVIOUS TREATY AND WOULD ENABLE THE SOVIETS TO RENEGE ON ANY COMMITMENTS OF TANGIBLE HELP IF GOE WERE TO TAKE ACTIONS WHICH THEY HAVE NOT APPROVED.)

4. GROMYKO HAD ASKED FAHMY TO CONVEY THE DRAFT TEXT TO SADAT.
GROMYKO HAD ALSO PROVIDED SOME "CLARIFICATIONS" OF THE DRAFT TEXT.

(A) HE HAD STATED SOVIETS ARE READY TO SEND SPARE PARTS, AS NEEDED,
ON THE BASIS OF PREVIOUSLY SIGNED AGREEMENTS FOR "WAR GEAR EQUIPMENT"
ALREADY SENT. PAYMENT, HOWEVER, WOULD HAVE TO BE IN HARD CURRENCY
IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS AGREEMENTS. RHNYHMN INTERJECTED THAT THIS
IN EFFECT NULLIFIED SOVIET READINESS TO SEND NEEDED SPARE PARTS.
IF HE HAD HARD CURRENCY, WHICH SOVIETS KNOW HE DOES NOT, HE
COULD BUY EQUIPMENT FROM EUROPE.

(B) SOVIETS HAD ALSO AGREED PROVIDE FIVE MI-1 HELICOPTERS AND TO
RETURN THE SEVENTY-TWO MIG ENGINES STILL IN USSR FOR REPAIR.
SOVIETS HAD ALSO OFFERED TO SEND "EXPERTS" TO ASSIST EGYPT DURING
THE DELIVERY AND ASSEMBLY OF THE FIVE HELICOPTERS. IN TELLING ME
THIS, SADAT LAUGHINGLY NOTED THERE IS NO NEED FOR SUCH SOVIET
EXPERTS SINCE EGYPTIANS ALREADY HAVE ABOUT FIFTY SUCH HELICOPTERS
AND ARE MORE EXPERT IN MAINTAINING THEM THAN ARE SOVIETS.

5. MEETING WITH BREZHNEV: SADAT THEN TURNED TO FAHMY'S MEETING
WITH BREZHNEV. AFTER SPEAKING OF SOVIET UNION'S "VERY GOOD
INTENTIONS" TOWARD EGYPT, BREZHNEV HAD ADDRESSED HIMSELF TO
SUBSTANCE. GROMYKO, HE CLAIMED, HAD TOLD HIM ABOUT THE
"POLITICAL DOCUMENT." BREZHNEV HAD SOUGHT TO CAST THIS AS AN
EGYPTIAN REQUEST AND INDICATED SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD GIVE GREAT
CONSIDERATION
TO THE MATTER. SIGNING SUCH DOCUMENT, BREZHNEV POINTED OUT, IS
"RIGHT STEP IN RIGHT DIRECTION." THERE SHOULD BE SOME SORT OF
LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION IN BOTH COUNTRIES. SUCH SIGNED AND
RATIFIED DOCUMENT WOULD FILL VACUUM THAT HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN
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THE TWO COUNTRIES. BREZHNEV HAD SAID, "WE TAKE THIS (SUCH A
DOCUMENT) TO BE THE BASIS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN
US ON VARIOUS MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST IN VARIOUS GENERAL AND
SPECIFIC FIELDS." (SADAT INTERJECTED THAT BREZHNEV REFERENCE WAS
TO MILITARY COOPERATION.) HE HAD ASKED "TOVARICH FAHMY" TO CONVEY
TO SADAT THAT, FOR A VARIETY OF IMPORTANT REASONS, HE LAID STRESS
ON POLITICAL RELATIONS AND POLITICAL COOPERATION IN THE FIRST
INSTANCE. POLITICAL RELATIONS ARE THE ESSENTIAL BASIS ON WHICH OTHER
COOPERATION CAN TAKE PLACE. IF THE BASE IS SOLID, EVERYTHING
COULD BE WORKED OUT IN OTHER FIELDS, SUCH AS ECONOMIC, CULTURAL,
TECHNICAL, ETC.

6. BREZHNEV REPEATEDLY STATED THAT ANY MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE TWO COUNTRIES CANNOT BE "ISOLATED" FROM POLITICAL RELATIONS OR
WITHOUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GLOBAL SITUATION. SOVIET UNION HAS
HELPED ARAB NATIONS TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AND TO PROTECT THE PRO-
GRESSIVE GAINS ACHIEVED BY THESE NATIONS AND THEIR SECURITY IN THE
FACE OF ANY ISRAELI AGGRESSION. BREZHNEV HAD STRESSED SOVIET UNION
MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE THAT ARMS IT HAS PROVIDED BE USED ONLY FOR
THIS PURPOSE. (HERE SADAT INTERJECTED THAT GOE HAS UP TO NOW SENT

\$13 MILLION WORTH OF ARMS TO SOMALIA--SEPTTEL.)

7. TURNING TO ANOTHER SUBJECT, WHICH SADAT DESCRIBED AS VERY IMPORTANT, BREZHNEV HAD NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS, AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE, HAVE "GREAT CAPABILITIES." "THESE CAPABILITIES AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE SOVIETS CAN BE RAISED TO A HIGH LEVEL IF SOLID POLITICAL COOPERATION TAKES PLACE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE IN THE AREA." BREZHNEV HAD THEN MADE THE FIRST OF TWO "THREATS."

(A) READING FROM THE REPORT, SADAT QUOTED BREZHNEV AS FOLLOWS:
"I WANT TO PUT BEFORE YOU A VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL FACT THAT HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE. WE HAVE HEARD SEVERAL LEADERS (UNNAMED)
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SAYING THAT EFFORTS DIRECTED TOWARD PEACE AND AGREEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST DEPEND ON THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE IT HAS NINETY-NINE PERCENT OF THE CARDS. THEY SAY THIS OR SOMEONE SEES IT IN THAT WAY. BUT I DO NOT THINK THEY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THE IMPERIALISTS WHO PROTECT ISRAEL AND ITS ALLIES, NAMELY THE UNITED STATES, HAVE NEVER BEEN ON THE SIDE OF THE JUST INTERESTS OF THE ARAB WORLD. WHY SHOULD WE THINK THE ISRAELI ALLIES (OF THE UNITED STATES) WILL BE PRESSURED. ON THE CONTRARY, THE IMPERIALISTS ALWAYS TRY TO PLANT INTRIGUE AMONG THE ARABS SO THAT THE ARAB STATES ENGAGE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH EACH OTHER. THIS ENABLES THE IMPERIALISTS TO KEEP THEIR POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL SEEK TO USE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO FURTHER THIS AIM, NAMELY TO HAVE A SOLID POSITION IN THE AREA. HENCE WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL. I SAY THAT WE (USSR) WILL NOT PERMIT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO BE USED AS A SCREEN TO HIDE PARTIAL AGREEMENTS THAT DEVIATE FROM REACHING A GLOBAL, COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION. I SAY IN ALL CANDOR THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL BE STRONGLY AGAINST THIS." IN READING BREZHNEV STATEMENT, SADAT NOTED THAT THE SOVIET LEADER WAS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH ENDED. THERE MUST BE SOME KIND OF COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT REACHED. BUT, SADAT NOTED, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NO CAPABILITY IN GENEVA. HENCE, HE VIEWED BREZHNEV'S STATEMENT AS A THINLY VEILED THREAT.

(B) THERE HAD BEEN A SECOND THREAT, THIS ONE INVOLVING AFRICA. SADAT QUOTED BREZHNEV AS FOLLOWS: "IN RECENT TIMES THE SITUATION HAS BECOME CRITICAL AROUND ETHIOPIA. THE IMPERIALISTS ARE TRYING ON THIS OCCASION TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS AND ARE USING YOUR (EGYPT'S) NEIGHBOR, THE SUDAN, AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES TO TRY TO PROVOKA A MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE AREA AIMED AT OVERTHROWING THE PROGRESSIVE REGIME IN ETHIOPIA. SUCH ACTS ALWAYS RAISE TENSION IN THE AREA AND CREATE A NEW FOCUS FOR CONFRONTATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO DISCOVER THAT THE IMPERIALISTS WANT TO BRING THE AFRICAN AND ARAB STATES INTO CONFRONTATIONS WITH EACH OTHER AND TO DIVERT THEM FROM THE MAIN ISSUES, E.G., ISRAELI AGGRESSION. THE IMPERIALISTS ARE ALSO PLACING OBSTRUC-
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TIONS IN THE WAY OF ELIMINATING RACIST REGIMES IN AFRICA. ALL THIS IS PLAYING WITH FIRE. WE WILL NOT STAND BACK WITH FOLDED HANDS. WE HOPE EGYPT, WHICH HAS A VERY IMPORTANT WEIGHT IN THE AREA AND ENJOYS GOOD RELATIONS WITH SUDAN, WILL DO ITS BEST NOT TO ALLOW EVENTS TO MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION." SADAT NOTED BREZHNEV WAS VERY FIRM IN SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE THEIR SUPPORT OF ETHIOPIA AND SOLIDIFY THEIR POSITIONS IN AFRICA IN GENERAL. WHEN FAHMY NOTED THAT IF ETHIOPIA CHOOSES TO CONDUCT HOSTILITIES AGAINST THE SUDAN, EGYPT WOULD COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF SUDAN BY ALL AVAILABLE MEANS, BREZHNEV ASKED THAT SADAT BE RE-ASSURED THAT HE WOULD NOT PERMIT ETHIOPIA TO TAKE ANY HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST SUDAN. HERE SADAT OBSERVED THAT BREZHNEV TALKED AS IF HE HAD ALREADY TAKEN OVER ETHIOPIA.

8. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS. SADAT THEN PUT HIS REPORTS ASIDE AND EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS ABOUT THE SOVIET ACTIONS. SPEAKING OF THE MOSCOW MEETING, HE OPINED THAT THEY HAD ASKED FOR THE MEETING SOLELY IN ORDER TO PLAY FOR TIME. SOVIET "WAR GEAR" IS "POURING" INTO ETHIOPIA. AFTER THEIR FAILURE IN ZAIRE, HIS "PROPHECY THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD ATTEMPT THE SAME KIND OF THING IN ETHIOPIA IS NOW TAKING PLACE. THEY NEED TIME TO TRAIN THE ETHIOPIANS, WHO ARE SENDING THEIR FORCES SOUTH AGAINST SOMALIA AND ALSO PLANNING A STRONG ATTACK AGAINST ERITREANS. GOE HAD PASSED DETAILS OF THIS NEW ETHIOPIAN THREAT TO SUDAN AND TO SOMALIA AND IS COORDINATING WITH THOSE TWO COUNTRIES TO MEET THE THREAT. EGYPTIAN MILITARY IS ON THE WATCH.

9. SADAT ALSO NOTED THAT THE SOVIETS COULD HAVE PUT GREAT PRESSURE ON HIM IF, AFTER THE FAHMY VISIT, THEY HAD SENT THREE OR FOUR SHIPLOADS OF ARMS. BY DOING SO, THEY WOULD HAVE "PUT ME IN CONFRONTATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND THE CONGRESS". HOWEVER, THEY WERE TAKING A HARD LINE, BUT ARE CHARACTERISTICALLY CLUMSY IN THEIR ACTIONS. THEY ARE SEEKING TO "SQUEEZE" HIM THROUGH THESE
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MEANS. THEY AND ISRAEL PUBLICLY DECLARED THAT HALF THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE IS GROUNDED FOR LACK OF SPARE PARTS AND THAT BY THE END OF THE YEAR THE REMAINING HALF WILL BE GROUNDED. THEY HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT EGYPTIAN MISSILE CAPABILITY HAS BEEN DEGRADED. ALL THIS, SADAT OPINED, IS AN EFFORT TO PRESSURE HIM.

10. SADAT INDICATED HE HAS NOT YET GIVEN ANY REPLY. HE IS STILL THINKING ABOUT WHAT TO SAY, BUT SOVIET HARD LINE ON AFRICA AND ON ARMS WILL NOT BRING HIM TO HIS KNEES. THEY ARE COMPLETELY WRONG IF THEY THINK THEY CAN DO SO. HE INTENDS TO REPLY, BUT NOT NOW. PRESIDENT CARTER SHOULD KNOW THAT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SOVIETS THIS TIME USED RELATIVELY MILD LANGUAGE, THEIR PRESSURE AND THREATS ARE CLEAR. THE PRESIDENT NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT HE NEVER SUBMITS HIS WILL TO ANYONE. ALSO, THEIR DESCRIPTION OF HIS

SITUATION IS INCORRECT. WITH USG ECONOMIC HELP, THIS LESSENS THE PRESSURE. MILITARILY, SADAT HOPED WE WOULD RECONSIDER THE WHOLE SITUATION AND SEE OUR WAY CLEAR TO PROVIDING HIM WITH SOME HARDWARE.

11. SINCE HE HAD MET PRESIDENT CARTER, SADAT CONTINUED, HE HAS PUT THE ISRAELI ISSUE IN SECOND PLACE. THE MAIN ISSUE IS THE SOVIET THREAT TO AFRICA AND ELSEWHERE. HE HAD NOT MENTIONED THIS AS YET TO FAHMY, BUT IT IS HIS CURRENT THINKING. "BOTH OF US TOGETHER, THE US AND EGYPT, CAN OUTMANEUVER THE SOVIETS."

12. ONE FINAL POINT SADAT ASKED BE CONVEYD TO PRESIDENT CARTER AND I QUOTE HIM: "IN SPITE OF WHAT HAS AND WILL HAPPEN IN ISRAEL, I AM CONVINCED MORE THAN AT ANY TIME THAT BOTH OF US CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. ONE MAJOR RESULT OF DOING SO, ESPECIALLY IF THE IMPETUS COMES FROM THE UNITED STATES, WILL BE THE DEVASTATING BLOW IT WILL GIVE TO THE SOVIETS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. I WISH TO RECONFIRM EVERYTHING PRESIDENT CARTER AND I AGREED UPON IN OUR PRIVATE TALK AND EMPHASIZE THAT I WILL NOT FAIL PRESIDENT CARTER IN FULFILLING MY PROMISES." SADAT FINISHED BY REITERATING THAT HE LOOKS FORWARD TO HEARING PRESIDENT CARTER'S VIEWS.

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13. COMMENT: SADAT'S PRESENTATION WAS SOMEWHAT DISJOINTED AND HE APOLOGIZED FOR NOT HAVING HAD THE TIME TO PREPARE HIMSELF ADEQUATELY FOR IT. I HAVE SOUGHT IN ABOVE PARAS TO GIVE IT A LITTLE MORE COHERENCE THAN IT HAD. IN CONTRAST PREVIOUSLY REPORTED FAHMY AND MFA RETICENCE TO TELL US MUCH ABOUT MOSCOW TALKS, THIS IS FULLEST ACCOUNT WE HAVE HAD. SADAT CLEARLY SEES IT AS IMPORTANT PART OF HIS ON-GOING DIALOGUE WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND IS ANXIOUS HAVE LATTER'S REACTION. EILTS

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